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ABSTRACT 
In Europe, market coupling stands for a further integration of wholesale trading 
arrangements across country borders. More specifically, it refers to the implicit 
auctioning of cross-border physical transmission rights via the hourly auctions for electric 
energy organized by power exchanges one day ahead of delivery. It therefore implies that 
the power exchanges can optimize the clearing of their day-ahead auctions. Due to 
verticals in the aggregated order curves, the optimal solution can be settled at different 
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prices.  In order for prices to give correct signals for network development and where to 
locate generation and consumption, price coordination between exchanges is necessary. 
The paper illustrates this issue, its relevance and discusses how to deal with it. 
 
KEY WORDS: Pricing, market equilibrium, operations research, power system 
economics, and duality 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Europe, generators self-schedule and they do this by submitting a program to the 
network operator. When which generators are turned on and run is the result of trade in 
several types of markets. Trade is mainly bilateral, but in most countries this is 
supplemented with auctions organized by power exchanges one day ahead of delivery for 
every hour of the next day. The auctions are used by market parties to fine tune their 
portfolios, which for instance means that generators can be on the supply as well as 
demand side depending on whether they are long or short. The exchanges use simple 
rules to settle contracts one day ahead of delivery when it is not worth getting into time 
consuming bilateral negotiations. Additionally, the exchanges act as counter-party for all 
transactions. The traded volume on the exchanges is typically only 10% of consumption4.  
 
                                                 
4 Exceptions are for instance Nord Pool and Omel, respectively the Scandinavian and Spanish exchange 
who have a traded volume close to 100% of consumption, but this is at least partly due to liquidity 
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While wholesale trade within countries is not constrained by the network, it is 
constrained at the borders where there are structural bottlenecks. The Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs) determine transfer capacities (so-called Net Transfer 
Capacities) independently per border and before trade actually takes place. In other 
words, before it is known how flows will be distributed over the different border lines 
and without taking the interdependencies of a meshed network into account. About 10% 
of consumption is traded across borders in Europe. 
 
As discussed in [1], the European version of a flow gate approach is not the most 
efficient way of dealing with the scarce network resources.  This is not about to change 
soon, but what is changing is how these capacities are then made available. Non-market 
based methods have largely been abolished and replaced by separate auctions per border. 
The auctions are organized by the TSOs and are typically for yearly, monthly and daily 
physical transmission rights.  
 
Arbitrage between the various power exchanges is therefore already possible but explicit, 
requiring the purchase of physical transmission rights on a contract path. Besides being 
constrained by the available border capacities, arbitrage is also constrained by the time 
lag between the closing of the different border and power exchange auctions and the 
uncertainty that this brings, especially given the high price volatility. Several empirical 
                                                                                                                                                 
supporting measures, i.e. Nord Pool has a monopoly for cross-border trade on the internal borders of the 
Scandinavian countries and only generators that pass through Omel get a capacity payment. 
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studies that compare the prices of border capacity with the price difference between 
exchanges indeed indicate that arbitrage is currently inefficient (see for instance [2]).  
 
Market coupling5 solves this problem as it refers to the implicit auctioning of physical 
transmission rights via the hourly auctions organized by power exchanges one day ahead 
of delivery. Nord Pool (Elspot) already does this for several years for the total available 
capacity on the internal borders of the Scandinavian countries6. Since November 2006, 
the capacity available day-ahead7 on the internal borders of France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands that used to be auctioned in a separate market organized by the respective 
TSOs is now used by the exchanges to optimize the clearing of their day-ahead auctions. 
This so-called Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) initiative is expected to be extended to 
include more countries8.  
 
Market Coupling implies that exchanges can optimize the clearing of the offers and bids 
for electric energy submitted to their day-ahead auctions. As such, total gains from trade 
for the auction participants are increased. Often quoted benefits are also reduced price 
volatility and increased liquidity as orders can be matched across borders. Due to 
                                                 
5 This terms can be confusing as it suggests that these markets were previously not coupled, which is not 
the case. 
6 Their implementation is commonly referred to as market splitting. 
7 Note that this is only a small fraction of total capacity, as most capacity goes to the yearly and monthly 
capacities which are still auctioned in a separate market. 
8 For instance a Memorandum of Understanding between exchanges, TSOs and regulators has been signed 
to include Germany. 
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verticals in the aggregated order curves, the optimal solution can however be settled at 
different prices. In order for prices to give correct signals for network development and 
where to locate generation and consumption, price coordination between exchanges is 
necessary. 
 
Section 2 introduces the market coupling optimization problem. Section 3 introduces the 
widely accepted approach to settle trade with network constraints, i.e. Location Marginal 
Pricing (LMP). Section 4 then illustrates that Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) have 
important properties, but they are no always uniquely determined. Section 5 discusses 
price coordination between exchanges, including how this issue is being dealt with in the 
TLC initiative, how relevant it currently is and will be, when this initiative is extended to 
more countries. 
 
2. Market Coupling Optimization Problem 
 
The market coupling optimization problem involves demand and supply orders of 
different exchanges that need to be matched in order to maximize the total gains from 
trade9. This means that the cheapest supply orders are matched with the most willing to 
pay demand orders. The only complexity in comparison with a single exchange 
optimization problem is that these orders come from different exchanges which represent 
a different network location. The demand and supply volumes traded on the different 
                                                 
9 Resulting from demand that needs to pay less than its willingness  to pay, supply that is paid more than 
what is wants to be paid and congestion rents that are transferred by the exchanges to the TSOs 
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exchanges do not have to be equal, as long as the traded volumes equalize in total and the 
resulting flows between locations are feasible given the limited available network 
capacity.  
 
For the market coupling optimization problem, the topology and capacities of the 
simplified network that need to be taken into account are given as they are pre-
determined by the involved TSOs. Given is also the volumes and prices of the orders that 
have been submitted. What needs to be determined is which orders are accepted at which 
hourly price for every exchange. The optimization problem can therefore be formulated 
as follows: 
 
Maximize the value of demand minus the cost of supply: 
  ( )jz jz iz izq z j i
Max q P q P
 
− 
 
∑ ∑ ∑                     (1)                                                                                                                                                     
With, 
jzP : price and limit of demand side order j submitted to exchange z (or introduced at 
location z) 
izP  : price and limit of supply side order i submitted to exchange z (or introduced at 
location z) 
,iz jzq q : the decision variable representing the accepted volume of the respective orders 
 
Subject to  
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Order constraints, making sure that the accepted volume is not higher than the volume 
limit of an order: 
 
  iz izq Q≤          (2) 
jz jzq Q≤                                                         (3)                            
With 
jzQ : volume limit of demand side order j submitted to exchange z (or introduced at 
location z) 
izQ  : volume limit of supply side order i submitted to exchange z (or introduced at 
location z) 
 
Network constraints10, respectively the constraints that equalizes the net injection at a 
location with what the off-takes at that location and the constraints that make sure that the 
flow on a interconnection of two locations is not higher than the capacity available 
between these locations: 
 
z∀ : ( ) 0iz jz zx z x
i j x
q q B θ θ− − − =∑ ∑ ∑                                (4) 
,z x Z∀ ∈ : ( )zx z x zxB Capθ θ− ≤           (5) 
With  
zxB : susceptance of the line interconnecting zone z and x 
                                                 
10 The constraints are DC load flow constraints, which are a simplification of the real power flow equations 
as for instance discussed in [8] 
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zθ : voltage angle 
zxCap : capacity of the line interconnecting location z and x 
 
Note that in practice, the exchanges solve this optimization problem for every hour of the 
next day and the hours are dependent because of so-called block orders [5]. For reasons 
of clarity abstraction is made of block order in this paper. 
 
3. Price properties  
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) are the most obvious choice to settle the optimal 
solution to the market coupling optimization problem. It basically means that the orders 
of an exchange are settled at the price that corresponds to the shadow price of its market 
clearing constraint (4). LMPs have interesting properties. They for instance give efficient 
signals for network development and location of generation and consumption. Locational 
Marginal Pricing is also widely used; especially in the North American markets (see for 
instance [3]). Although a lot of literature is available discussing the properties of LMPs 
(see for instance [4]), much less is available on implementation issues of LMP. This 
paper discusses an implementation issue related to the verticals in the aggregated order 
curves of the exchanges that is relevant for the European context.  
 
The properties of LMPs can be derived from the optimality conditions of the market 
coupling optimization problem (1)-(5), as has been done in [6] for the more generalized 
problem. This leads to the following equations that define the necessary relation between 
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the LMPs and the shadow prices of (5), which correspond to the prices of the 
interconnections: 
 
[ ], : 0zx z x zx xz
x
z x B p p µ µ∀ − + − =∑       (6) 
With 
pz: the LMP, or simply locational price corresponding to location z. Note that demand 
and supply orders of a single location or exchange are cleared at the same price.  
xzµ : the price of the line (or flow gate) interconnecting location x and z, in the direction 
x-z, which corresponds to the shadow price of (5). Therefore this price is zero if 
constraint (5) is non-binding, which is the case when the line is not fully used. 
 
Note that LMPs are not always as intuitive as one might think. Based on simplified 
examples in non-meshed networks, these prices have sometimes been attributed 
properties that the approach cannot deliver. Illustrative is what the authors in [6] call 
‘folk theorems’ of LMP. Furthermore, in [7] prices observed in PJM (applies LMP) are 
discussed that at first sight can be considered abnormal but are actually normal LMP 
prices. 
 
4. Freedom in Prices 
 
4.1. Price ranges 
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Consider 3 exchanges PX1, PX2 and PX3 to which the orders listed in Table 1 are 
submitted. Figure 1 illustrates the implied aggregated order curves for the three 
exchanges separately and jointly.  If the exchanges are not coupled they would have 
cleared a volume of respectively 100, 100 and 100 MWh at a price of 10, 25 and 50 
€/MWh. Total gains from trade in that case would have been 18500€11. If the exchanges 
would be coupled without binding network constraints, they would have cleared a total 
volume of 400 MWh at a price of 25€/MWh. In comparison with the non-coupled 
situation, total volume is the same in this illustration, but total gains from trade have gone 
up to 30500€12. The difference, 12000€, is because at PX3 more demand can be 
supplied13 and additionally the more expensive supply offer at PX3 can be replaced by 
the cheaper supply offer introduced at PX114.  
 
The optimal solution implies a transfer of 200MWh from PX1 to PX3, i.e. an injection in 
the network of 200MWh at location 1 and a withdrawal of 200MWh at location 2. Figure 
2 illustrates the possible locational prices and their corresponding export level. Note that 
these prices reflect the property of LMP that there is a single price per location to settle 
demand and supply at that location. Take for instance PX1:  
• No supplier is offering at a price below 10€/MWh, while at such low prices 
demand will definitely want to be supplied fully, so that the corresponding import 
level for prices lower than 10€/MWh is 100MWh 
                                                 
11  (PX1:) 100MWh (90-10€/MWh) + (PX2:) 100MWh (90-25€/MWh) + (PX3:) 100MWh (90-50€/MWh) 
12 300MWh (90-10€/MWh) + 100MWh (90-25€/MWh) 
13 100MWh(90-10€/MWh) 
14 100MWh(50-10€/MWh) 
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• Demand does not want to pay more than 90€/MWh, while at such high prices 
supply will definitely want to be supplied fully, so that the corresponding export 
level for prices higher than 90€/MWh is 300MWh 
• In between 10 and 90€/MWh demand wants to be fully supplied and suppliers 
want to supply all they offered as they can make a profit, so that the 
corresponding export level for prices between 10 and 90€/MWh is 200MWh 
• If the price is 10€/MWh or 90€/MWh respectively supply and demand can be 
curtailed as the orders are marginally accepted at those prices, so that there are 
respectively several corresponding import and export levels, as illustrated in 
Figure 2 
 
In other words, an export of 200MWh corresponds to several possible locational prices at 
PX1. As illustrated in Figure 2, the same counts for PX3, which we will refer to as 
locational price ranges. Therefore the LMP property of having a single price per location 
alone does not fix the prices in this illustration. Another LMP property is that if there are 
no binding network constraints, the price of the lines should be zero. Figure 3 illustrates 
the impact on the network of the transfer between PX1 and PX3. Note that it is assumed 
that all line susceptances are equal so that 1/3 of the transfer goes via PX2 and 2/3 goes 
via the direct interconnection. Assuming that there is enough capacity to make this 
solution feasible, the remaining optimality conditions (6) translate into: 
1 2 32 0p p p− − =           (7) 
1 2 32 0p p p− + − =                                                      (8)           
1 2 32 0p p p− − + =                                                   (9)           
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These equations basically imply that the locational prices have to be equal. Given that the 
price of PX2 is fixed at 25€/MWh (Figure 2: there is no locational price range for PX2), 
this is the price for the three exchanges. In conclusion, an important LMP property is that 
LMPs are equal if there is no congestion in the network. Furthermore, in this example, 
there is only one set of prices that satisfies all LMP properties. 
 
4.2. Alternative sets of LMPs  
If we introduce binding network constraint to the example introduced in the previous 
section, the optimal solution changes. Figure 4 illustrates this with a binding capacity 
constraint between PX1 and PX3. In this network, a transfer between PX2 and PX3 is 
more interesting than a transfer between PX1 and PX3 as in the optimal solution without 
network constraints, because the latter uses more of the scarce network resource (double 
the amount) which offsets the supply cost advantage PX1 (10€/MWh) has over PX2 
(25€/MWh). In this network setting, the optimal solution is to transfer as much as 
possible between PX2 and PX3 and to use what remains on the interconnector between 
PX1 and PX3 for a transfer between these exchanges, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates that the optimal solution yields two price ranges (PX2: 25<p<90; 
PX3: 50<p<90), but the export level of PX1 implies a price of 10. Given that there is a 
binding constraint between PX1 and PX3 so that 13µ  is positive and given that p1 is 10, 
(6) translates into: 
2 3 1320 0p p µ− − + =                                         (10)      
2 310 2 0p p− + − =                    (11) 
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2 3 1310 2 0p p µ− − + − =         (12) 
 (10) – (12) is a set of 2 two linear independent equations with three unknowns15, 
meaning that there is some freedom in the prices. Indeed, solving the example in Matlab 
using the linprog solver yields prices of 10, 41 and 73€/MWh, respectively for PX1, PX2 
and PX3 and solving it with CPLEX yields prices of 10, 30 50€/MWh. In other words, 
the example clearly illustrates that prices can differ significantly depending on which 
software is used to solve the problem. If no additional method is applied to consciously 
choose between the alternative sets of LMPs, the solution will depend on the solver 
software that is used. 
  
5. Price coordination 
5.1. Importance of price coordination 
Perhaps the simplest way of dealing with price ranges is to allow every exchange to 
independently choose which price they take of the possible prices that correspond with 
the optimal export level that comes out of the market coupling problem. The consequence 
would however be that even the most basic LMP property, which is that prices should be 
equal if there is no congestion, is not necessarily satisfied. Even though the most willing 
to pay demand would still be matched with the cheapest suppliers, the distribution of 
gains from trade would be different. In this case, the network could generate congestion 
rents, giving incentives to further invest in the network, while increasing the network 
capacity would not improve welfare. In other words, only LMPs give correct signals for 
network development and also for where to locate generation or consumption. Therefore, 
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the best way to coordinate prices is to use the shadow prices of the market clearing 
constraint, which are the LMPs. 
 
The remaining question is what to do in case there are alternative sets of LMPs. Consider 
the illustration from the previous section. Table 3 summarizes some of the possibilities to 
choose from. As indicated in the table, the price of the line interconnecting PX1 and PX3 
( 13µ ) is always positive. However, the signal to invest can be double as high, depending 
on which LMPs are chosen. The highest 13µ  value is actually the negative effect on total 
gains from trade if the capacity would be reduced with 1 MW, while the lowest 13µ  value 
is the positive effect on total gains from trade if the capacity would be increased with 1 
MW: 
• 1 MW more, is 3/2 MWh more transfer between PX1 and PX3, which would 
mean replacing 3/2 MWh of supply in PX3 at 50€/MWh with supply from PX1 at 
10€/MWh, which is a gain of 60€ (3/2(50-10)) 
• 1 MW less, is 3/2 MWh less transfer between PX1 and PX3, which would reduce 
by 3/2 MWh demand in PX3 with a value 90€/MWh and supply in PX1 at 
10€/MWh which is a loss of 120€ (3/2(90-10)) 
 
The signal you want to give for network development is of course the one corresponding 
to an increase of capacity, which in this case is the lowest value. For a convex 
optimization problem, it is in fact always the lowest value. It can therefore be concluded 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Actually bounded unknowns, as they are bounded by the price ranges 
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that a good and straightforward way to choose between alternative sets of LMPs is to 
minimize congestion rents, subject to the LMP properties, such as equations (6) 
 
5.2. Relevance of price coordination 
Which price is chosen on a price range is of course only relevant if coupled exchanges 
are often faced with such price ranges and if they are significant. Figure 6 illustrates the 
price ranges on Belpex16 for the first 2 months of operation. In 30% of the hours 
observed there is no price range, but in 20% of the hours there is a price range larger than 
20€/MWh, with some observations peaking close to 400€/MWh. Given that a typical 
wholesale price is 50€MWh, this is a very relevant part of the price formation on the 
power exchanges. 
 
For the moment, the TLC initiative encompasses only France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, which are aligned in that order. As the internal borders are not meshed, 
LMPs have more straightforward properties. For instance, the price of an interconnector 
is the difference between the location prices a both sides of the interconnector. 
Additionally the flow always goes from a high price region to the low price region, which 
is not necessarily the case if the network is meshed.  
 
In [9], the price determination in case of price ranges is explained for TLC. The approach 
is specifically for three aligned markets. It is based on taking the middle price of an 
overlap between price ranges, subject to the LMP properties, which are called high level 
                                                 
16 Note that these observations are from the first two months of operation of this exchange.  
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properties of the algorithm. If market coupling is extended to more markets and meshed 
networks, the approach discussed in this paper could be used, which is to minimize 
congestion rents, subject to the optimality conditions in terms of prices of the market 
coupling problem. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Market coupling means that exchanges optimize the clearing of the electric energy orders 
submitted to their day-ahead auctions. In doing so, orders introduced at different 
locations are exchanged to the extent that the available network capacities allow. Prices at 
these optimal exchange levels can be undetermined on an interval or price range, due to 
the verticals in the aggregated order curves. For a single power exchange, a simple rule 
such as taking the middle price of the possible prices is sufficient. For coupled 
exchanges, coordination is however necessary in order not to distort the incentives for 
network development and locational incentives for new generation or consumption.  
Additionally it has been discussed that LMPs can be derived from the optimality 
conditions of the market coupling optimization problem, but that these conditions do not 
necessarily uniquely determine the prices, in which case it has been illustrated that the set 
of prices needs to be chosen that minimizes congestion revenues subject to the optimality 
conditions. 
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 Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Demand and supply orders introduced to PX 1 to 3 
PX1 PX2 PX3 
Demand orders (bids) 
100MWh@ 
90€/MWh 
100MWh@ 
90€/MWh 
200MWh@ 
90€/MWh 
Supply orders (offers) 
300MWh@ 
10€/MWh 
175MW@ 
25€/MWh 
100MWh@ 
50€/MWh 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Demand and supply orders introduced to PX 1 to 3 
(€/MWh) Linprog CPLEX Min CR Max CR 
PX1 10 10 10 10 
PX2 41 30 30 50 
PX3 73 50 50 90 
13µ  94 60 60 120 
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Figure 1: Aggregated order curves of three power exchanges separately and jointly 
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Figure 2: locational price ranges corresponding to the optimal solution (Figure 1: intersection of 
aggregated order curves joined for the three exchanges) 
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Figure 3: Impact optimal solution (Figure 1, intersection of aggregated order curves joined for the 
three exchanges) on the network 
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Figure 4: Introducing price sets 
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Figure 5: locational price ranges for solution in Figure 4 
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Figure 6: observations from Belpex 
 
